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An analysis of the terrorism studies field reveals a number of methodological, theoretical 
and ethical-normative problems. One of its more serious problems is its tendency to 
uncritically reproduce a number of highly questionable narratives and assumptions about 
terrorism as a phenomenon and counterterrorism as state response. For example, a great 
deal of past and recently published terrorism research unreflectively assumes that: non-
state terrorism poses an existential threat to modern societies; there is a „new terrorism‟ 
that is religiously motivated, willing to employ weapons of mass destruction, and aimed 
primarily at causing mass casualties; the roots of terrorism lie in individual psychological 
abnormality and religious extremism; and coercive-based counterterrorism is an effective 
response to non-state terrorism. This paper argues that these misconceptions are not 
simply errors based on poor research. Rather, these broadly accepted understandings – 
this terrorism „knowledge‟ – also work politically to reify and reproduce state power. In 
particular, this „scientifically‟ generated terrorism „knowledge‟ frequently functions to, 
among others: de-legitimise resistance by non-state actors; justify domestic political 
projects unconnected to terrorism, such as social surveillance; bolster the power and 
priorities of the agencies of state security; benefit powerful economic actors linked to the 
security sector, such as private security firms, defence industries, and pharmaceutical 
companies; control wider social and political dissent and set the parameters for 
acceptable political debate; and provide intellectual justification for foreign imperial 
projects. However, academic research is never without political and normative 
consequence; knowledge is always for somebody and for something. This paper argues 
that given the current situation in the field, there is an urgent need for an explicitly 
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In the years since the attacks of September 11, 2001, terrorism studies has undergone a 
major transformation from minor subfield of security studies to a large stand alone field 
with its own dedicated journals, research centres, leading scholars and experts, research 
funding opportunities, conferences and university study programmes. In fact, it is 
probably one of the fastest expanding areas of research in the Western academic world, 
with literally thousands of new books and articles published over the past few years,
2
 and 
increasing numbers of postgraduate dissertations.
3
 While such a rapid expansion offers 
the possibility of exciting new research and the potential for genuine advancement in 
existing knowledge, past and recent review exercises on the state of the field would inject 
a note of caution into such optimism. These reviews suggest that terrorism studies as a 
whole is beset by a number of epistemological, theoretical, methodological and ethical-
normative problems which limit its potential for producing rigorous empirical findings 
and genuine theoretical advancement. 
 In this paper, I briefly touch on some of the key criticisms that have been levelled 
at the field of terrorism studies. In particular, I focus on what is arguably one of the most 
serious problems facing the field, namely, its state-centricity and the way it functions 
politically to reify state power. Its close identification with state priorities and 
perspectives, its uncritical reproduction of accepted narratives and terrorism „knowledge‟, 
its conformity and totalising certainty and its inbuilt commitment to providing counter-
terrorist policy relevant research, poses major analytical and normative problems for the 
field. Analytically, it narrows the potential range of research subjects, encourages 
conformity in outlook and method, and obstructs vigorous, wide-ranging debate, 
particularly regarding the causes of non-state terrorism. Normatively, it identifies an 
entire field and scholarly community with the reproduction of state power and the 
promotion of particular kinds of political projects and forms of state action of dubious 
efficacy or moral legitimacy. In short, it functions to construct the field of terrorism 
studies as an arm of state security.  
For these reasons, I argue that there is an urgent need for an explicitly „critical 
terrorism studies‟. A „critical terrorism studies‟ (CTS) would be distinctive due to its 
willingness to challenge accepted knowledge and commonsense about terrorism and its 
acute awareness of the power-knowledge relationship in terrorism-related research. As a 
consequence, CTS scholarship would be characterised by a critical reflexivity regarding 
the academic production and uses of terrorism-related research, the adoption of a broader 
research focus that includes the use of terrorism by state actors, an acknowledgement of 
                                                 
2
 Research using publishing databases has found that even before 2001, terrorism publications had grown 
over 234 percent on average between 1988-2001 in fields like terrorism studies, communication studies, 
comparative politics, peace studies, economics and psychology. Avishag Gordon, 2004. „Terrorism and 
Knowledge Growth: A Databases and Internet Analysis‟, in Andrew Silke, ed., Research on Terrorism: 
Trends, Achievements and Failures, London: Frank Cass, 109. 
3
 Research by Avishag Gordon found that in the ten years from 1990-1999 at least 160 research 
dissertations on terrorism-related subjects had been carried out. It can reasonably be assumed that this 
number has further increased since 2001. Avishag Gordon, 1999. „Terrorism Dissertations and the 
Evolution of a Speciality: An Analysis of Meta-Information‟, Terrorism and Political Violence, 11(2): 141-
50.  
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the interdependencies between state policy and non-state terrorism and an openly 
normative, emancipatory praxis in regards to counter-terrorism.  
 
TERRORISM STUDIES: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 
 
Both past and more recent review exercises of the terrorism studies field have revealed an 
embarrassing list of methodological and analytical problems, including: its poor research 
methods and procedures, particularly its over-reliance on secondary information and 
general failure to undertake primary research;
4
 its failure to develop an accepted 
definition of terrorism and subsequent failure to develop rigorous theories and concepts;
5
 
the descriptive, narrative and condemnatory character of much of its output; its 
dominance by orthodox international relations approaches and general lack of inter-
disciplinarity; its ahistoricity and tendency to treat contemporary terrorism as a „new‟ 
phenomenon that started on September 11, 2001;
6
 its restricted research focus on a few 
topical subjects and its subsequent failure to fully engage with a range of other important 
topics,
7
 not least the issue of state terrorism;
8
 and its strong prescriptive focus
9
 – among 
others.
10
   
                                                 
4
 Although there are clearly obstacles to primary research in terms of „talking to terrorists‟, a growing 
number of studies by scholars such as Jeffrey Sluka, Mia Bloom, John Horgan, Jessica Stern and others 
demonstrate that these obstacles are not nearly as insurmountable as some might assume. I would argue 
along with the anthropologist Joseba Zulaika that the failure to engage directly with the subject of terrorism 
studies is reflective of their taboo nature and the fear of contamination. There is a pervasive attitude within 
some sectors of the field that understanding terrorist motives equates to sympathising with them and 
explaining their behaviour equates to justifying or exonerating it, which is why most terrorism „experts‟ 
have never met a „terrorist‟. There are few fields of study where the subject is deliberately kept at such 
great ontological and moral distance from the researcher than terrorism studies. A typical expression of this 
taboo comes from David Jones and M.L.R. Smith who suggest that all efforts by critically-oriented scholars 
to understand the root causes of contemporary terrorism or empathise with the injustices which may be 
driving it confers „a legitimacy which demands empathy‟ and is akin to the toleration of Nazism. David 
Jones and M.L.R. Smith, 2007. „Pedagogy or Pedantry: A Rejoinder to Our Critics‟, International Affairs, 
83(1): 185. See also, David Jones and M.L.R. Smith, 2006. „The Commentariat and Discourse Failure: 
Language and Atrocity in Cool Britania‟, International Affairs, 82(6): 1077-1100. For a critique of this 
tendency in the field, see Joseba Zulaika and William Douglass, 1996. Terror and Taboo: The Follies, 
Fables, and Faces of Terrorism, London: Routledge, 149-50, 179; Cynthia Mahmood, 1995. Fighting for 
Faith and Nation: Dialogues with Sikh Militants, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; and 
Judith Butler, 2002. „Explanation and Exoneration‟, Theory & Event, 5(4). 
5
 Most terrorism scholars have simply abandoned the search for definition and use the term in their research 
without defining it. This is a real problem for the field, as continual debate over key concepts and ideas is 
critical for theoretical innovation and intellectual progress. 
6
 Andrew Silke‟s analysis of 490 articles published in the core terrorism journals from 1990-1999 found 
that only 13 focused on non-contemporary terrorism, and of those, only seven looked at terrorism before 
1960. Andrew Silke, 2004. „The Road Less Travelled: Recent Trends in Terrorism Research‟, in Silke, ed., 
Research on Terrorism, 209. See also Marie Breen Smyth, „Wither the Study of Political Terror? 
Challenges, Problems and Issues for a Critical Research Agenda‟, International Studies Association (ISA) 
47
th
 Annual Convention, 28 Feb. – 3 March, 2007, Chicago, United States. 
7
 The field tends to focus excessively on a few topical cases, most of which reflect current political 
concerns. For example, in recent years, hundreds of studies have been undertaken on Al Qaeda and related 
forms of „Islamic terrorism‟, Northern Ireland, the Middle East conflict and issues related to counter-
terrorism in the US and UK, such as the role of the media, suicide terrorism, weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) terrorism, cyber-terrorism and terrorist financing. In part, the problem is related to the disciplinary 
and geographical character of the main scholars in the field, who are generally from international relations 
 4 
 However, a much more serious problem for the field is that it has, for the most 
part, adopted state-centric priorities and perspectives on terrorism. Within the literature, 
terrorism is seen as an illegitimate form of political violence practiced mainly by non-
state actors; moreover, it is viewed as a kind of asymmetric warfare waged against 
(mainly democratic) states and societies. It is also viewed as posing a serious, even 
existential threat to the survival of liberal democratic states, and thus, extraordinary state 
counter-terrorism efforts are considered to be de facto necessary and legitimate. 
Importantly, it is assumed that one of the key purposes of terrorism studies is to provide 
policy-relevant research to aid the authorities in their counter-terrorism campaign.   
  Partly as a consequence of its inherent state-centricity, there is a tendency by 
many terrorism scholars to uncritically reproduce a number of accepted assumptions, 
narratives and discursive formations, thereby constructing and maintaining a particular 
kind of terrorism „knowledge‟. A series of studies on the academic and political 
discourses of terrorism
11
 reveals that the field as a whole tends to continuously reproduce 
                                                                                                                                                 
and security studies and based in the U.S. or the UK. The cause and consequence of this restricted focus is 
a general failure to fully examine a range of other important issues, including, among many others: state 
terrorism; terrorism and the global South; gender and terrorism; the history of terrorism; and the political 
causes of terrorism. Few of these subjects have thus far received sustained attention from scholars in the 
field or have been studied primarily from within other disciplines. 
8
 Andrew Silke‟s review of 490 articles in the core terrorism studies journals reveals that only 12 or less 
than two percent of them examined state terrorism. Silke, „The Road Less Travelled‟, 206. 
9
 Andrew Silke concludes that much terrorism research is driven by policy concerns and is limited to 
government agendas. Andrew Silke, 2004. „The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on 
Terrorism‟, in Silke, ed., Research on Terrorism, 58. Moreover, these weaknesses in the field are 
interconnected. As Gaetano Ilardi explains: „The prescriptive focus of terrorism studies has also diverted 
attention from other critical matters, not the least of which is the development of a sound theoretical 
understanding of the dynamics of terrorism.‟ Gaetano Ilardi, 2004. „Redefining the Issues: The Future of 
Terrorism Research and the Search for Empathy‟, in Silke, ed., Research on Terrorism, 215. 
10
 These and other criticisms are made in both past and more recent reviews of the field, including: Alex 
Schmid and Albert Jongman, 1988. Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, 
Databases, Theories and Literature, Oxford: North Holland; Edward Herman and Gerry O‟Sullivan, 1989. 
The ‘Terrorism’ Industry: The Experts and Institutions that Shape our View of Terror, New York: 
Pantheon Books; Alexander George, ed., 1991. Western State Terrorism, Cambridge: Polity Press; Zulaika 
and Douglass, Terror and Taboo; Silke, ed., 2004. Research on Terrorism; and Jonny Burnett and Dave 
Whyte, „Embedded Expertise and the New Terrorism‟, Journal for Crime, Conflict and the Media Vol. 1, 
No. 4 (2005), 1-18. Many of the points raised in this brief overview are given a more detailed treatment in 
Jeroen Gunning, 2007. „Babies and Bathwaters: Reflecting on the Pitfalls of Critical Studies on Terrorism‟, 
International Studies Association (ISA) 47
th
 Annual Convention, 28 Feb. – 3 March, 2007, Chicago, United 
States. 
11
 This research employs a discourse analytic approach which involves careful analysis of hundreds of 
academic and political texts. The main findings of this broader research agenda have been published 
amongst others as: Richard Jackson, forthcoming 2007. „Constructing Enemies: “Islamic Terrorism” in 
Political and Academic Discourse‟, Government & Opposition; Richard Jackson, forthcoming 2007. 
„Playing the Politics of Fear: Writing the Terrorist Threat in the War on Terrorism‟, in George Kassimeris, 
ed., Playing Politics With Terrorism: A User’s Guide, New York: New York University Press; Richard 
Jackson, forthcoming 2007. „Critical Reflections on Counter-Sanctuary Discourse‟, in Michael Innes, ed., 
Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International; 
Richard Jackson, forthcoming 2007. „The Evolution and Implications of EU Counter-Terrorism Discourse 
after September 11, 2001‟, Cambridge Review of International Affairs; Richard Jackson, 2006. „Genealogy, 
Ideology, and Counter-Terrorism: Writing Wars on Terrorism from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush Jr‟, 
Studies in Language & Capitalism, online journal available at: http://www.languageandcapitalism.info/; 
Richard Jackson, 2005. Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counterterrorism, 
 5 
a series of core assumptions, narratives and discursive formations about terrorism which 
have subsequently been accepted as „knowledge‟. For example, a great deal of past and 
recently published terrorism research unreflectively takes as its starting point the 
assumption that terrorism can be understood and studied objectively and scientifically 
without political bias. As mentioned, terrorism studies also tends to treat terrorism as 
primarily a form of illegitimate non-state political violence; when state terrorism is 
discussed, it is usually limited to descriptions of „state-sponsored terrorism‟ by so-called 
„rogue states‟. The deafening silence on the direct use of terrorism by states within the 
literature is underpinned by a strong belief that liberal democratic states in particular 
never engage in terrorism as a matter of policy, only in error or misjudgement.  
The core sustaining narrative of the field however is that non-state terrorism poses 
a significant and existential threat to modern societies and that without significant 
investment in counter-terrorism it could be catastrophic to Western states. This narrative 
is perhaps unsurprising given the psychological shock engendered by the September 11, 
2001 attacks, as well as the raison d’etre it provides the field. Related to this, a powerful 
recent discursive construction common to terrorism studies is the notion of a „new 
terrorism‟ that is purportedly religiously motivated, willing to employ weapons of mass 
destruction and aimed primarily at causing mass casualties. In addition, much recent 
research uses terms like „religious terrorism‟ and „Islamic‟ or „Islamist terrorism‟ in ways 
that imply an unambiguous and linear causal relationship between forms of Islam and 
terrorism. Other common narratives and assumptions within the field include: non-state 
terrorism is rarely if ever successful, which illustrates its inherent irrationality; the roots 
of terrorism lie in individual psychological abnormality and religious or ideological 
extremism brought on by „radicalisation‟ processes; democratic states are more 
vulnerable to terrorism because of their inherent rights and freedoms; the media provides 
the oxygen of publicity to terrorism; and coercive-based counter-terrorism is legitimate 
and effective as a response to campaigns of non-state terrorism.  
 These and other assumptions and narratives collectively make up a widely 
accepted „knowledge‟ or discourse of terrorism. They are reproduced continuously in the 
core terrorism studies journals, in conferences and in hundreds of publications every year 
by academics and think-tanks. In addition, they are reproduced culturally and politically 
through the media, public debate, education and the arts. The important point is that 
virtually all of these narratives are overly simplistic, misconceived and have a weak basis 
in empirical research; they are in fact, highly debatable.
12
 There is not the space here to 
provide counter-evidence or arguments to all the assumptions and narratives of the 
discourse; I have given more detailed first order critique of the dominant terrorism 
assumptions and narratives elsewhere.
13
 It will suffice to discuss a few points which 
illustrate how unstable and contested this widely accepted „knowledge‟ is. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Manchester: Manchester University Press; and Richard Jackson, 2005. „Security, Democracy and the 
Rhetoric of Counter-Terrorism‟, Democracy & Security, 1(2): 147-71. 
12
 The dominant narratives I have described here are virtually identical to a set of dominant „myths‟ 
identified in a review of the field from 1979, which is an indication of how persistent and powerful this 
knowledge is. See Michael Stohl, 1979. „Myths and Realities of Political Terrorism‟, in Michael Stohl, ed., 
The Politics of Terrorism, New York: Marcel Dekker, 1-19.  
13
 Jackson, „Constructing Enemies‟; Jackson, „Playing the Politics of Fear‟; and Jackson, „Critical 
Reflections on Counter-Sanctuary Discourse‟. 
 6 
First, a number of recent studies have seriously questioned the notion of „new 
terrorism‟, demonstrating empirically and through argument that the continuities between 
„new‟ and „old‟ terrorism are much greater than any purported differences. In particular, 
they show how the assertion that the „new terrorism‟ is primarily motivated by religion is 
largely unsupported by the evidence.
14
 Second, an increasing number of studies suggest 
that the threat of terrorism to Western or international security is vastly over-
exaggerated.
15
 Related to this, a number of scholars have convincingly argued that the 
likelihood of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction is in fact, miniscule,
16
 as is 
the likelihood that so-called rogue states would provide WMD to terrorists.
17
 Third, there 
is no evidence that terrorism is the result of poverty, educational underachievement, 
unemployment or social alienation,
18
 nor is there any evidence of a „terrorist personality‟ 
or any discernable psychopathology among individuals involved in terrorism.
19
 
Most importantly in the current political and moral climate and contrary to widely 
accepted knowledge within terrorism studies, every major empirical study has thrown 
doubt on the notion of a direct causal link between religion and terrorism, and in 
                                                 
14
 See Thomas Copeland, 2001. „Is the New Terrorism Really New? An Analysis of the New Paradigm for 
Terrorism‟, Journal of Conflict Studies, XXI(2): 91-105; Isabelle Duyvesteyn, 2004. „How New is the New 
Terrorism?‟, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 27(5): 439-54; and Alexander Spencer, 2006. „Questioning 
the Concept of “New Terrorism”‟, Peace, Conflict & Development, 8: 1-33, available online at: 
http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk. Interestingly, Mark Sedgwick argues that al Qaeda is more easily 
explained in terms of classic theories of terrorism as developed by nineteenth-century Italian anarchists 
than as a new form of religious terrorism. Mark Sedgwick, „Al-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious 
Terrorism‟, Terrorism and Political Violence, 16: 4 (2004), pp. 795-814.  
15
 See, among others: Jackson, „Playing the Politics of Fear‟; John Mueller, 2006. Overblown: How 
Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats and Why We Believe Them, New 
York: The Free Press; John Mueller, 2005. „Six Rather Unusual Propositions about Terrorism‟, Terrorism 
and Political Violence, 17: 487-505; Ehud Sprinzak, 1998. „The Great Superterrorism Scare‟, Foreign 
Policy, 112: 110-24; and Zulaika and Douglass, Terror and Taboo. 
16
 See Brian Jenkins, 1998. „Will Terrorists go Nuclear? A Reappraisal‟, in Harvey Kushner, ed., The 
Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium, London: Sage; David Long, 1990. The Anatomy of 
Terrorism, New York: The Free Press, 131-2; and Sprinzak, „The Great Superterrorism Scare‟. A number 
of scholars point out that despite tens of thousands of terrorist attacks over the past four decades, more 
people have been killed in a single conventional car bomb by the Real IRA in 1998 than in every terrorist 
attack using WMD before or since combined. 
17
 Interestingly, before the September 11, 2001 attacks, many senior officials in the U.S. doubted that rogue 
states would risk providing WMD to terrorists. See Countering the Changing Threat of International 
Terrorism, Report of the National Commission on Terrorism, June 2000, available online at: 
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html, 6; and the Gilmore Commission quoted in Dilip Hiro, 2002. 
War Without End: The Rise of Islamic Terrorism and Global Response, London: Routledge, 391. 
18
 Major empirical studies by Robert Pape and Marc Sageman for example, show that the notion that 
„Islamic terrorism‟ results from poverty, disaffection and alienation is empirically unsupported. In fact, 
both of these studies show that the overwhelming majority of „terrorists‟ are middle or upper class, of 
above average educational standing, professionally employed, often married or in relationships, are well 
integrated into their communities and generally have good future prospects. See Robert Pape, 2005. Dying 
to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, New York: Random House; and Marc Sageman, 2004. 
Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
19
 See John Horgan, 2005. The Psychology of Terrorism, London: Frank Cass; Andrew Silke, 1998. 
„Cheshire-cat Logic: The Recurring Theme of Terrorist Abnormality in Psychological Research‟, 
Psychology, Crime and Law, 4: 51-69; Martha Crenshaw, 1992. „How Terrorists Think: What Psychology 
can Contribute to Understanding Terrorism‟, in Laurence Howard, ed., Terrorism: Roots, Impact, 
Responses, London: Praeger; and Raymond Corrado, 1981. „A Critique of the Mental Disorder Perspective 
of Political Terrorism‟, International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 4(3-4): 293-309;  
 7 
particular the link between Islam and terrorism. The Chicago Project on Suicide 
Terrorism for example, which compiled a database on every case of suicide terrorism 
from 1980 to 2003, some 315 attacks in all, concluded that „there is little connection 
between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world‟s 
religions.‟20 Some of the key findings of the study which support this assessment include: 
only about half of the suicide attacks from this period can be associated by group or 
individual characteristics with Islamic fundamentalism; the leading practitioners of 
suicide terrorism are the secular, Marxist-Leninist Tamil Tigers, who committed 76 
attacks; of the 384 individual attackers on which data could be found, only 166 or 43 
percent were religious; there were 41 attacks attributed to Hezbollah during this period, 
of which 8 were carried out by Muslims, 27 by communists and 3 by Christians (the other 
3 attackers could not be identified); and 95 percent of suicide attacks can be shown to be 
part of a broader political and military campaign which has a secular and strategic goal, 
namely, to end what is perceived as foreign occupation.
21
 
Similarly, Marc Sageman‟s widely quoted study, in which he complied detailed 
biographical data on 172 participants of „Islamic terrorist‟ groups, also throws doubt on 
any simple causal relationship between religion and terrorism. Some of the key findings 
of his study include: only 17 percent of the terrorists had an Islamic religious education; 
only 8 percent of terrorists showed any religious devotion as youths; only 13 percent of 
terrorists indicated that they were inspired to join solely on the basis of religious beliefs; 
increased religious devotion appeared to be an effect of joining the terrorist group, not the 
cause of it; „Islamic terrorist‟ groups do not engage in active recruitment, as there are 
more volunteers than they can accommodate; the data, along with five decades of 
research, failed to provide any support for the notion of religious „brainwashing‟; and 
there is no evidence of any individual joining a terrorist group solely on the basis of 
exposure to internet-based religious material.
22
 In short, these findings contradict both the 
substance and the tenor of much within the terrorism studies literature.  
Finally, the notion that terrorism is a form of political violence practiced primarily 
by non-state actors is similarly belied by the evidence. The simple fact is that if terrorism 
refers to violence directed towards or threatened against civilians which is designed to 
instill terror or intimidate a population for political reasons – an entirely uncontroversial 
definition of terrorism and one which is commonly adopted within the literature – then 
state terrorism is arguably of much greater significance than dissident or non-state 
terrorism. States after all, have killed, tortured and intimidated hundreds of millions of 
people
23
 over the past few decades, and a great many continue to do so today in places 
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 Pape, Dying to Win, 4. 
21
 Ibid, pp. 4, 17, 139, 205, 210. Pape‟s findings are supported by recent ethnographic research. See Mia 
Bloom, 2005. Dying to Kill, New York: Columbia University Press. 
22
 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 93, 97, 110, 115, 121-5, 163. Other studies which question 
the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism include: Stephen Holmes, 2005. „Al Qaeda, 
September 11, 2001‟, in Diego Gambetta, ed., Making Sense of Suicide Missions, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; Ariel Merari, 1990. „The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle 
East‟, in Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism, New York: Cambridge University Press; and Ehud 
Sprinzak, 2000. „Rational Fanatics‟, Foreign Policy, 120: 66-73. 
23
 A conservative estimate of state-instigated mass murder, forcible starvations and genocide against 
civilians suggests that states have been responsible for 170-200 millions deaths in the twentieth century 
alone – more than all other forms of deadly conflict, including war, combined. See R.J. Rummel, 1994. 
Death by Government, Somerset, NJ: Transaction Books. Over the past two decades, up to 300,000 people 
 8 
like Colombia, Haiti, Algeria, Zimbabwe, Myanmar, Uzbekistan,
24
 Kashmir, Palestine, 
Chechnya, Tibet, North Korea, Indonesia, Iraq, the Philippines and elsewhere.  
Moreover, contrary to the dominant discourse, the involvement of Western 
democracies in terrorism has a long but generally ignored history, which includes: the 
extensive use of official terror by Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, the U.S. and other 
colonial powers in numerous countries throughout the colonial period;
25
 the practices of 
strategic bombing during and since World War II;
26
 U.S. support and sanctuary for a 
range of right-wing terrorist groups like the Contras, the Mujahideen and anti-Castro 
groups
27
 during the Cold War, many of whom regularly committed terrorist acts;
28
 U.S. 
tolerance of Irish Republican terrorist activity in the U.S.;
29
 U.S. support for systematic 
state terror by numerous right-wing regimes across the world, perhaps most notoriously 
El Salvador, Chile, Guatemala, Indonesia and Iran;
30
 British support for Loyalist 
                                                                                                                                                 
have been „disappeared‟ worldwide. See Jeffrey Sluka, 2000. „Introduction: State Terror and 
Anthropology‟, in Jeffrey Sluka, ed., Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror, Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press. By comparison, non-state terrorism is responsible for a few hundred 
deaths on average per year. 
24
 The former British ambassador to Uzbekistan reveals the nature and extent of Uzbek state terror and 
western complicity in Craig Murray, 2006. Murder in Samarkland: A British Ambassador’s Controversial 
Defiance of Tyranny in the War on Terror, Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing. 
25
 Evidence of the use of terror by the colonial authorities is contained in an extremely large literature on 
the history and nature of colonialism, as well as the post-colonialism literature. For more immediately 
accessible summaries of colonial terror, see among others: Ian Beckett, 2001. Modern Insurgencies and 
Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750, London: Routledge; Jonathan Barker, 
2002. The No-Nonsense Guide to Terrorism, New Internationalist/Verso, 61-86; and Herman and 
O‟Sullivan, The ‘Terrorism’ Industry, 3-7. 
26
 Beau Grosscup demonstrates how doctrines of strategic bombing are rooted in the logic that sowing 
terror among civilians is an effective and legitimate means of undermining the will of the enemy and 
forcing capitulation. See Beau Grosscup, 2006. Strategic Terror: The Politics and Ethics of Aerial 
Bombardment, London: Zed Books. 
27
 Michael Stohl quotes CIA data that shows that Cuban exile groups engaged in 89 separate terrorist 
incidents from 1969-79 alone. See Michael Stohl, 1988. „States, Terrorism and State Terrorism: The Role 
of the Superpowers‟, in Robert Slater and Michael Stohl, eds., Current Perspectives on International 
Terrorism, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 189; Edward Herman, 1982. The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in 
Fact and Propaganda, Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 63; and more broadly, Warren Hinckle and W. 
W. Turner, 1981. The Fish is Red: The Story of the Secret War Against Castro, New York: Harper and 
Row. 
28
 See, among others: Herman and O‟Sullivan, The ‘Terrorism’ Industry; Frederick Gareau, 2004. State 
Terrorism and the United States: From Counterinsurgency to the War on Terrorism, London: Zed Books; 
and Steven Livingston, 1994. The Terrorism Spectacle, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. U.S. officials 
admitted as early as 1983 that the Contras were engaged in the killing of civilians, kidnapping, torture and 
indiscriminate attacks. It later emerged that a CIA Contra training manual, Psychological Operations in 
Guerrilla Warfare, advocated exactly these kinds of civilian-directed proinsurgency tactics. Similar forms 
of training were provided through proxies to the Afghan insurgents. See Mahmood Mamdani, 2004. Good 
Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror, New York: Three Leaves Press, 
102, 116. 
29
 Official .S. toleration of IRA activity is described in Daniel Byman, 2005. Confronting Passive Sponsors 
of Terrorism, Analysis Paper No. 4, The Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution, 
21-7. 
30
 Ironically, and in a deliberate attempt to subvert the idea of U.S. support for state terror, many of these 
regimes received U.S. military assistance under the auspices of „counter-terrorism‟ programmes. See 
among others: Ruth Blakeley, 2007. „Bringing the State Back in to Terrorism Studies‟, International 
Studies Association (ISA) 47
th
 Annual Convention, 28 Feb. – 3 March, 2007, Chicago, United States; 
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terrorism in Northern Ireland
31
 and various other „Islamist‟ groups in Libya and Bosnia, 
among other;
32
 Spanish state terror during the dirty war against ETA;
33
 French support 
for terror in Algeria and against Greenpeace in the Rainbow Warrior bombing; Italian 
sponsorship of right-wing terrorists; and Western support for accommodation with 
terrorists following the end of several high profile wars
34
 – among many other examples. 
Western support for terrorism continues today in the form of U.S. military and political 
support for various warlords who employ terror against civilians in places like 
Afghanistan and Somalia, such as the Afghan warlord, General Dostum,
35
 and continued 
U.S. sanctuary and support of anti-Castro terrorists,
36
 former Latin American state 
terrorists
37
 and other assorted Asian anticommunist groups.
38
 
 In short, there is a great deal of research which contradicts the primary narratives 
and understandings of terrorism studies and demonstrates that much of the primary 
assumptions and knowledge of the field is overly simplistic, misconceived, incorrect or 
                                                                                                                                                 
George, Western State Terrorism; Herman, The Real Terror Network; Herman and O‟Sullivan, The 
‘Terrorism’ Industry; and Gareau, State Terrorism and the United States.  
31
 See Jeffrey Sluka, „“For God and Ulster”: The Culture of Terror and Loyalist Death Squads in Northern 
Ireland‟, in Sluka, ed., Death Squad. 
32
 For example, evidence from former British and French intelligence officers suggests that MI6 paid large 
sums of money to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, a terrorist group associated with al Qaeda, to 
assassinate Colonel Gadafy in 1996. It is alleged that British intelligence provided sanctuary to members of 
the group in Britain and subsequently thwarted attempts by Libya to bring Osama bin Laden to justice. See 
„MI6 “halted” Bin Laden Arrest‟, Guardian Weekly, November 14-20, 2002. There is also evidence that 
British and American intelligence agencies provided a green light to various „Islamist‟ groups training 
insurgents to fight in Bosnia. See Michael Meacher, „Britain now faces its own blowback. Intelligence 
interests may thwart the July bombings investigation‟, The Guardian, September 10, 2005.  
33
 See Begona Aretxaga, „A Fictional Reality: Paramilitary Death Squads and the Construction of State 
Terror in Spain‟, in Sluka, ed., Death Squad; Zulaika and Douglass, Terror and Taboo. 
34
 Mamdani makes the pertinent point that in places like Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Angola, Mozambique and 
Congo governments were compelled to reconcile with terrorist movements who had engaged in mass 
civilian-directed terror. In this sense, reconciliation became a codeword for impunity and the lack of justice 
functioned to sustain an international atmosphere of tolerance towards terror. Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad 
Muslim, 250-51. Such an approach would be akin to compelling the U.S. and its allies today to accept 
amnesty for the Taliban in Afghanistan and the various Iraqi insurgent groups in power-sharing settlements. 
35
 For a discussion of terror by the Afghan warlord, General Dostum, see Gareau, State Terrorism and the 
United States, 199-200. Gareau cites a number of reports by the UN and several human rights organisations 
documenting the use of extreme violence against prisoners and civilians. Disturbingly, Western military 
scholars appear to condone the use of state terror as they accept that the Afghan warlords employ „violent 
operating methods‟, but argue that „antagonizing them or calling them to account under Western legal 
structures is completely counterproductive to the reconstitution of Afghanistan. We must resist the 
inclination to be judgmental.‟ Sean Maloney, 2004. „Afghanistan: From here to Eternity?‟, Parameters, 
Spring 2004, 13. 
36
 U.S. sanctuary for anti-Castro terrorists goes back to before the Bay of Pigs and continues today. See 
Barker, The No-Nonsense Guide to Terrorism, 75; and Marcela Sanchez, „Moral Misstep: Some Terrorists 
Get a Hero‟s Welcome‟, Washington Post, September 3, 2004, available online at: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57838-2004Sept2.html. 
37
 For example, Emmanuel „Toto‟ Constant, a notorious former death squad commander from Haiti with 
suspected links to the CIA, has been given sanctuary in the U.S. since the 1994 invasion. See David Grann, 
2001. „Giving “The Devil” His Due‟, The Atlantic Monthly, 287(6): 55-75. 
38
 The U.S. continues to harbour groups such as Government of Free Vietnam (GFVN), the Cambodian 
Freedom Fighters (CFF) and other Vietnamese and Laotian dissident groups who have been involved in a 
number of terrorist attacks over the past few years. See Joshua Kurlantzick, „Guerillas in Our Midst: Is the 




 The point is not to establish an alternative final truth about terrorism, 
but simply to draw attention to the inherent instabilities of the dominant narratives.
40
 A 
key question which follows is how these assumptions and narratives have come be 
accepted as established knowledge and commonsense when they are in fact so contested, 
and why they continue to hold such sway over the field. 
 
TERRORISM STUDIES AND STATE POWER 
 
There are a number of reasons which taken together can explain the persistence of this 
unstable terrorism „knowledge‟. At the most basic level, this knowledge is the direct 
consequence of poor research methodologies and faulty assumptions of the field, as 
identified in the review exercises mentioned above; more rigorous and thorough research 
would probably result in a much greater level of scepticism towards the existing canon of 
knowledge and an unwillingness to reproduce it uncritically. 
Second, the dominance of this knowledge is directly related to the origins of the 
terrorism studies field in counter-insurgency studies,
41
 security studies and neo-realist 
approaches to international relations. These related fields are also heavily dominated by 
state-centric paradigms and orthodox national security assumptions; terrorism studies has 
simply carried the same ontological and epistemological orientation into the area of 
terrorism research. In a related development, the events of September 11, 2001 
galvanised a whole new generation of scholars who were understandably eager to offer 
their skills in the cause of preventing further such attacks. Because these new scholars 
lacked a background in the existing literature and were eager to engage in research 
directly relevant to the government‟s counter-terrorism campaign, it is not surprising that 
existing orthodoxies – especially those propagated by state security officials and 
terrorism industry stalwarts – were adopted unquestionably. In this sense, there has been 
a seamless transition between the role of U.S. universities in assisting the fight against 
communism during the Cold War and the fight against terrorism in the war on terror.
42
 
 Third and most importantly, the persistence of this „knowledge‟ is related to the 
„embedded‟ or „organic‟ nature of many terrorism experts and scholars; that is, the extent 
to which terrorism scholars are directly linked to state institutions and sources of power 
                                                 
39
 Andrew Silke refers to „a cabal of virulent myths and half-truths whose reach extends even to the most 
learned and experienced.‟ Silke, „An Introduction to Terrorism Research‟, 20. 
40
 Of course, beyond the question of intellectual reliability, language and narratives are also significant for 
the way in which they structure subject positions, construct accepted knowledge, commonsense and 
legitimate policy responses to the actors and events being described, exclude and de-legitimise alternative 
knowledge and practice, naturalise a particular political and social order, and construct and maintain a 
hegemonic regime of truth. These kinds of effects are explored in more detail in Jackson, „Constructing 
Enemies‟.  
41
 The emergence of terrorism studies as a branch of counter-insurgency studies is explained in more detail 
in Burnett and Whyte, „Embedded Expertise‟, 11-13. In 1988, Schmid and Jongman concluded that much 
of the field‟s early output appeared to be „counterinsurgency masquerading as political science.‟ Schmid 
and Jongman, Political Terrorism, 182. 
42
 See Eric Herring and Piers Robinson, 2003. „Too Polemical or Too Critical? Chomsky on the Study of 
the News Media and US Foreign Policy‟, Review of International Studies, 29: 553-68; Noam Chomsky, 
Laura Nader, Immanuel Wallerstein, Richard Lewontin, Richard Ohmann, Howard Zinn,  Ira Katznelson, 
David Montgomery and Ray Seiver, 1997. The Cold War and the University: Towards an Intellectual 
History of the Postwar Years, New York: The New Press. 
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in ways that make it difficult to distinguish between the state and academic spheres.
43
 
Crucial in the evolution of „the terrorism industry‟ has been the influence of the RAND 
Corporation, a non-profit research foundation founded by United States Air Force with 
deep ties to the American military and political establishments, as well as private security 
and military companies. RAND scholars have been deeply influential in both 
constructing the accepted knowledge of the field and in communicating it to 
policymakers and the public.
44
 Moreover, RAND scholars have been influential in 
establishing other terrorism research centres, such as the St Andrews Centre for Studies 
in Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), and are involved in the running of the two 
main English language journals of the field. RAND-connected scholars sit on the 
editorial boards of both Terrorism and Political Violence and Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism. In fact, RAND scholars author a significant proportion of the articles 
published in these journals.
45
 
More broadly, it can be argued that universities themselves are „embedded‟ 
institutions in the sense that they are deeply integrated into the corporate-government 
nexus and function as one of the primary supporting institutions of the liberal capitalist 
order. This function can be seen partly in: the extent to which business people sit on the 
board of trustees of many universities; university research is heavily dependent on state, 
corporate and foundation funding; there is a revolving door of personnel between the 
universities, the corporate sector and the state;
46
 and one of the primary functions of the 
university is to produce graduates useful to the state and business.
47
 Although there are 
few systematic studies, there is evidence that very large sums of investment from state, 




Together with certain state, military, think tank and public intellectuals, there is 
little doubt that the leading terrorism studies scholars now constitute an influential and 
exclusive „epistemic community‟ – a network of „specialists with a common world view 
                                                 
43
 A detailed, if somewhat polemical analysis of the public-private links that make up the „terrorism 
industry‟ as it was before September 11, 2001 can be found in Herman and O‟Sullivan, The ‘Terrorism’ 
Industry and George, Western State Terrorism. A more recent analysis can be found in Burnett and Whyte, 
„Embedded Expertise and the New Terrorism‟. A more mainstream terrorism studies assessment concludes 
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field and are denied access to policymakers and major conferences. See Ilardi, „Redefining the Issues‟, 222. 
44
 Senior officials in several U.S. administrations have held positions in RAND, and as with other 
foundations and think tanks, there is a revolving door of personnel between RAND and the state. For 
example, Condoleeza Rice and Donald Rumsfeld are both former RAND administrators. See Burnett and 
Whyte, „Embedded Expertise‟, 8. 
45
 See Silke, „The Road Less Travelled‟, 194. 
46
 For example, McGeorge Bundy, Walter Rostow, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Anthony Lake 
and Condoleeza Rice were all university professors before they were appointed as national security 
advisors, as were several U.S. representatives to the UN, namely, Donald McHenry, Jeane Kirkpatrick and 
Madeline Albright. See David Newsome, 1995-6. „Foreign Policy and Academia‟, Foreign Policy, 101: 53. 
47
 See Herring and Robinson, „Too Polemical or Too Critical?‟; Chomsky et al, The Cold War and the 
University; and Michael McKinley, 2004. „The Co-option of the University and the Privileging of 
Annihilation‟, International Relations, 18(2): 151-72. McKinley notes that the CIA has a significant 
presence on university campuses from where it recruits (p.163). 
48
 Andrew Silke argues that the U.S. government was spending enormous sums on terrorism research even 
before 2001 – $727 million in 2000 and at least another $2.4 billion since then. Andrew Silke, 2004. „An 
Introduction to Terrorism Research‟, in Silke, ed., Research on Terrorism, 26. 
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about cause and effect relationships which relate to their domain of expertise, and 
common political values about the type of policies to which they should be applied‟.49 
Based on an examination of 32 prominent terrorism studies scholars, Edna Reid describes 
the research process among these intellectuals as a closed, circular and static system of 
information and investigation which tends to accept dominant myths about terrorism 
without strong empirical investigation for long periods before empirical research 
disproves them.
50
 From a Gramscian perspective, the core terrorism studies scholars can 
be understood as „organic intellectuals‟ intimately connected – institutionally, financially, 
politically and ideologically – with a state hegemonic project. From this perspective, the 
state-centric orientation of the field and its continuing reproduction of the guiding myths 
is a natural and thoroughly unsurprising consequence of its position within the existing 
power structure. 
 Finally, employing a critical theorising framework would suggest that this 
„knowledge‟ persists and is continually reproduced as a dominant discourse because it is 
functional to the exercise of state and elite power. On the one hand, it provides a coherent 
and familiar discursive frame for internal policy debate; on the other, it draws on a series 
of powerful cultural frames and existing discursive structures, making it ideal for the 
generation of public legitimacy and the construction of political boundaries.
51
 That is, it 
can easily be employed as a „political technology‟ in the promotion of particular political 
projects and the long-term maintenance of elite power. From this perspective, the central 
assumptions and narratives of terrorism studies are deeply ideological in that they 
frequently work to: de-legitimise dissent and resistance to state power and elite projects; 
render invisible the terror at the heart of much state violence, including forms of counter-
terrorism and counter-insurgency; justify domestic political projects, such as the 
construction of intrusive surveillance systems; bolster the power and priorities of the 
agencies of state security and the executive branch by normalising a state of exception; 
benefit powerful economic actors linked to the security sector, such as private security 
firms, defence industries and pharmaceutical companies; control wider social and 
political dissent and set the parameters for acceptable public debate; provide intellectual 
and moral justification for foreign projects like military expansion or regime change; and 
prevent the emergence of alternative, non-violent responses to terrorism – among others.  
 In short, the knowledge practices of terrorism studies function as a kind of 
disciplinary and hegemonic truth regime designed to reify existing structures of power. 
At the very least, the dominant knowledge of the field is an ideal type of „problem-
solving theory‟.52 As Robert Cox argues, problem-solving theory „takes the world as it 
finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which 
they are organised, as the given framework for action‟, and then works to „make these 
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 Diane Stone, 1996. Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy Process, London: 
Frank Cass, 86.  
50
 Edna Reid, 1993. „Terrorism Research and the Diffusion of Ideas‟, Knowledge and Policy, 6: 28. 
51
 A number of studies have noted the extent to which the discourse of terrorism can be used as a practice 
of statecraft to construct and maintain notions of identity and boundaries between self and other, inside and 
outside and citizen and alien. See Carol Winkler, 2006. In the Name of Terrorism: Presidents on Political 
Violence in the Post-World War II Era, Albany, NY, State University of New York Press; Jackson, Writing 
the War on Terrorism; and Annamarie Oliverio, 1997. „The State of Injustice: The Politics of Terrorism 
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 For a more in-depth discussion on this point, see Gunning, „Babies and Bathwaters‟. 
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relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular 
sources of trouble‟.53 It does not question the extent to which the status quo – the 
hierarchies and operation of power and the inequalities and injustices thus generated – is 
implicated in the „problem‟ of terrorism and other forms of subaltern violence. Moreover, 
through the use of social scientific language and modes of inquiry, political assumptions 
about terrorism are masqueraded as technical issues and sides are taken on terrorism‟s 
major ethical and political questions. 
In the end, these characteristics of the terrorism studies field, in particular its state 
centricity and problem-solving orientation, have important analytical and normative 
implications. Analytically, it narrows the potential range of research subjects, encourages 
conformity in outlook and method, and obstructs vigorous, wide-ranging debate, 
particularly regarding the causes of non-state terrorism and the use of terrorism by liberal 
democratic states and their allies. Constrained from moving beyond the narrow state-
centric paradigm within which it functions, the possibilities for theoretical and empirical 
innovation and advancement are curtailed.  
Perhaps more importantly, from a normative perspective it means that terrorism 
studies is a largely co-opted field of research that is deeply enmeshed with the actual 
practices of counter-terrorism and the exercise of state power.
54
 Disturbingly, it means 
that terrorism studies is complicit in a range of state projects, many of which are not only 
counter-productive but oppressive in and of themselves, such as increased surveillance, 
profiling, shoot-to-kill policies and creeping restrictions on civil liberties. It also 
identifies the field with a number of recent state policies of dubious moral legitimacy, 
such as regime change, rendition, torture and extrajudicial assassination. Terrorism 
studies provides both the intellectual justification for such counter-terrorist policies, and 
the broader academic legitimacy which the state can call upon to convince the public of 
the rightness of its policies. As a consequence, terrorism studies must bear some moral 
responsibility for the conspicuous abuses of previous counter-terrorism campaigns and 
the current war on terror.  
 
CRITICAL TERRORISM STUDIES 
 
In the broadest sense, critical terrorism studies (CTS) refers to self-consciously critical 
terrorism-related research which adopts a sceptical attitude towards state-centric 
understandings of terrorism and which does not take existing terrorism knowledge for 
granted but is willing to challenge widely held assumptions and narratives. In this sense, 
rather than a precise theoretical label, CTS is more of an orientation or critical 
perspective that seeks to maintain a certain distance from prevailing ideologies and 
orthodoxies. Beyond this broad orientation however, we would argue that CTS is founded 
upon on a specific set of epistemological, ontological and ethical-normative 
commitments. 
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 Robert Cox, 1981. „Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory‟, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 10(2): 128-9. 
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 As Steve Smith argues, the broader discipline of international relations within which terrorism studies 
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constructing the possibilities for existence of the international system. Steve Smith, 2004. „Singing Our 






CTS rests upon a number of specific epistemological commitments, including an 
understanding of knowledge as a social process constructed through language, discourse 
and inter-subjective practices. From this perspective, it is understood that terrorism 
knowledge always reflects the social-cultural context within which it emerges, which 
means among other things that it is highly gendered and Eurocentric. CTS understands 
that knowledge is always intimately connected to power, that knowledge is „always for 
someone and for some purpose‟ and that „regimes of truth‟ function to entrench certain 
hierarchies of power and exclude alternative, counter-hegemonic forms of knowledge and 
practice. CTS therefore, starts with an acceptance of the basic insecurity of all knowledge 
and the impossibility of neutral or objective knowledge about terrorism.
55
 It also evinces 
an acute sensitivity to the ways in which terrorism knowledge can be deployed as a 
political technology in the furtherance of hegemonic projects and directs attention to the 
interests that underlie knowledge claims. Thus, CTS starts by asking: who is terrorism 
knowledge for, and what functions does it serve in supporting their interests? 
There are at least three practical consequences of this broad epistemological 
orientation. First, similar to the field of Critical Security Studies (CSS), CTS begins from 
an analysis of the epistemological and ontological claims that make the discipline 
possible in the first place,
56
 in particular, the false naturalism of traditional theory and the 
political content of all terrorism knowledge. More specifically, its research focuses on 
uncovering and understanding the aims of knowledge-production within terrorism 
studies, the operation of the terrorism studies epistemic community and more broadly, the 
social and political construction of terrorism knowledge. Such analysis can be achieved 
using deconstructive, narrative, genealogical, ethnographic and historical analyses, as 
well as neo-Gramscian and Constructivist approaches. The purpose of such research is 
not simply descriptive nor is it to establish the „correct‟ or „real truth‟ of terrorism; rather, 
it aims to destabilise dominant interpretations and demonstrate the inherently contested 
and political nature of the discourse. It aims to reveal the politics behind seemingly 
neutral knowledge. 
A second practical consequence for CTS research is a continuous and transparent 
critical-normative reflexivity in the knowledge-production process.
57
 That is, CTS 
research acknowledges the impossibility of neutral or objective terrorism knowledge and 
evinces an acute awareness of the political use to which it can be put, as well as its inbuilt 
biases and assumptions. It thus attempts to avoid the uncritical use of labels, assumptions 
and narratives regarding terrorism in ways that would naturalize them or imply that they 
were uncontested. Crucial in this respect is an appreciation of the inherently gendered and 
Eurocentric character of dominant knowledge and discourse on terrorism. 
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 See Michael Williams and Keith Krause, 1997. „Preface: Toward Critical Security Studies‟, in Michael 
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57
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A third consequence for CTS research is methodological and disciplinary 
pluralism, in particular, a willingness to adopt post-positivist and non-international 
relations-based methods and approaches. In this sense, CTS refuses to privilege 
materialist, rationalist and positivist approaches to social science over interpretive and 
reflectivist approaches.
58
 Avoiding an exclusionary commitment to the narrow logic of 
traditional social scientific explanation based on linear notions of cause and effect, CTS 
accepts that Constructivist and post-structuralist approaches which subscribe to an 
interpretive „logic of understanding‟ can open space for questions and perspectives that 
are foreclosed by positivism and rationalism. This stance is more than methodological; it 
is also political in the sense that it does not treat one model of social science as if it were 






Ontologically, CTS is characterised by a general scepticism towards, and often a 
reticence to employ, the „terrorism‟ label because it is recognised that in practice it has 
always been a pejorative rather than analytical term and that to use the term is a powerful 
form of labelling that implies a political judgement about the legitimacy of actors and 
their actions. Terrorism is fundamentally a social fact rather than a brute fact; while 
extreme physical violence is experience as a brute fact, its wider cultural-political 
meaning is decided by social agreement and inter-subjective practices. In this sense, just 
as „races‟ do not exist but classifications of humankind does, so too „terrorism‟ does not 
exist but classifications of different forms of political violence does.
60
 That is, „The 
nature of terrorism is not inherent in the violent act itself. One and the same act… can be 
terrorist or not, depending on intention and circumstance‟61 – not to mention cultural and 
political context. For this reason, CTS refuses to define terrorism either in ways that de-
legitimise only some actors while simultaneously according the mantle of legitimate 
violence to others,
62
 or in ways that legitimise violence simply because they are 
conducted in particular circumstances, such as during war. Instead, CTS views terrorism 
fundamentally as a strategy or tactic of political violence that can be, and frequently is, 
employed by both state and non-state actors and during times of war or peace.
63
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Moreover, as a strategy, terrorism involves the deliberate targeting of civilians in order to 
intimidate or terrorise for distinctly political purposes. As Alex Schmid puts it, like war, 
terrorism is also a continuation of politics by other means.
64
 CTS rejects all attempts to 
promiscuously extend the definition of terrorism to other forms of subaltern violence, 
such as criminal or religious violence, or to de-politicise the origins of the violence.  
The important point is that terrorism is not an ideology or form of politics in 
itself;
65
 it is rather, a tool employed at specific times, for specific periods of time, by 
specific actors and for specific political goals. In this sense, it is not a freestanding 
phenomenon: there is no terrorism, just the instrumental use of terror by actors.
66
 This has 
important implications for notions of identity, and subsequently for the strategies and 
ethics of counter-terrorism, not least because it implies that the „terrorist‟ label is never a 
fixed or essential identity and that „terrorists‟ may choose to abandon its use as a tactic 
for achieving political aims. A pertinent illustration of the ontological instability of the 
terrorist label and the potentialities for political metamorphosis is the observation that 
there are no less than four recognised „terrorists‟ who have gone on to win the Nobel 
Peace Prize: Menachim Begin, Sean McBride, Nelson Mandela and Yassir Arafat.
67
 In 
other words: „Once a terrorist, is not always a terrorist.‟68 Similarly, the inability of the 
UK and U.S. governments to agree on a common list of proscribed terrorist organisations, 
despite holding similar definitions of terrorism, speaks to the inherent subjectivity of 
applying this label in the real world.
69
    
There are a number of direct consequences of adopting this particular ontological 
stance. For example, there is a determination by CTS scholars to redress the current 
imbalance within orthodox terrorism studies and „bring the state back in‟ to terrorism 
research, exploring the logic and circumstances in which states employ civilian-directed 
violence to terrorise and intimidate society for political purposes.
70
 CTS is also interested 
in uncovering the political and strategic „causes‟ or reasons why actors choose to employ 
terrorist tactics, and the processes by which they abandon the use of terrorism as a 
political strategy in particular historical and political contexts. In this sense, CTS is 
determined to avoid universalising practices that are very specific and naturalising what 
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is actually highly contingent.
71
 Instead, CTS remains acutely sensitive to the need for 
historical, political and cultural context in understanding the use of terrorism as a 
strategy. In addition, given the central role that labelling plays within the terrorism 
studies field, CTS is committed to questioning the nature and politics of representation – 
why, when, how and for what purpose do groups and individuals come to be named as 




In addition to the reasons alluded to above, CTS is openly normative in orientation for the 
simple reason that through the identification of who the „terrorist other‟ actually is – and 
it should be remembered that deciding and affirming which individuals and groups may 
be rightly called „terrorists‟ is a routine practice in the field – terrorism studies actually 
provides an authoritative judgement about who may legitimately be killed, tortured, 
rendered or incarcerated by the state in the name of counter-terrorism.
72
 In this sense, 
there is no escaping the ethico-political content of the subject. Rather than projecting or 
attempting to maintain a false neutrality or objectivity, CTS openly adheres to the values 
and priorities of universal human and societal security, rather than traditional, narrowly 
defined conceptions of national security in which the state takes precedence over any 
other actor. Moreover, in the tradition of Critical Theory, the core commitment of CTS is 
to a broad conception of emancipation, which is understood as the realisation of greater 
human freedom and human potential and improvements in individual and social 
actualisation and well-being.  
In practice, this ethical standpoint necessarily entails transparency in specifying 
one‟s political-normative stance and values, a continuous critical reflexivity regarding the 
aims, means and outcomes of terrorism research, particularly as it intersects with state 
counter-terrorism, and an enduring concern with questions of politics and ethics. In turn, 
this has clear implications for research funding, knowledge production and the ethics of 
research in „suspect communities‟.73 It also entails an enduringly critical stance towards 
projects of state counter-terrorism, particularly as they affect human and societal security. 
CTS recognises that such a stance involves a delicate and creative balance between 
avoiding complicity in oppressive state practices through a continual process of critique, 
whilst simultaneously maintaining access to power in order to affect change.
74
 From this 
perspective, CTS is determined to go beyond critique and deconstruction and actively 
work to bring about positive social change – in part through an active engagement with 
the political process and the power holders in society.  
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In short, based on an acceptance of a fundamental prior responsibility to „the 
other‟, CTS sees itself as being engaged in a critical praxis aimed at ending the use of 
terror by any and all actors and in promoting the exploration of non-violent forms of 
conflict transformation. Specifically, this entails a willingness to try and understand and 
empathise with the mind-sets, world views and subjectivities of non-Western „others‟ and 
a simultaneous refusal to assume or impute their intentions and values.
75
 We recognise 
that in relation to the „terrorist other‟, this is a taboo stance within Western scholarship. 
Moreover, it is a taboo that has been institutionalised in a legal framework in which 
withholding information from the authorities is a crime, in which academics are being 
asked to report on their students
76
 and in which attempting to understand the 
subjectivities of „terrorist‟ suspects could be interpreted as „glorification of terrorism‟ – a 
crime under UK law.
77
 Nonetheless, we view it as both analytically and ethically 
responsible and remain committed to defending the intellectual and ethical integrity of 
such work. 
In this sense, CTS imbues many of the values, concerns and orientations of peace 
research, conflict resolution and CCS. Contrary to the views of some critics, CTS is not 
an anti-state or anti-Western project; neither is it a discourse of complacency or an 
appeasement of tyranny.
78
 Rather, it is a vigorous anti-terror project based on 
fundamental human rights and values and a concern for social justice, equality and an end 
to structural and physical violence and discrimination. It views civilian-directed forms of 
violence as inherently illegitimate, regardless of what type of actor commits them, in 
what context or to what purpose. It also presupposes that human agency and human 
ingenuity are potentially unlimited, particularly in the pursuit of non-violent solutions to 
injustice and violence, and that there are more humane and effective ways of responding 
to terrorism than reflexively engaging in retaliatory and disproportionate counter-
violence.  
In sum, CTS is both a theoretical commitment and a political orientation.
79
 
Theoretically, it engages in permanent critical exploration of the ontology, epistemology 
and praxis of terrorism studies and counter-terrorism practice, and seeks ultimately to 
introduce alternative interpretations and understandings into an established field of 
discourse. Politically, it is committed to an ethical reflexivity in relation to its own 
knowledge practices, an „ethos of political criticism‟80 in relation to the broader field and 
an emancipatory politics in regards to praxeological questions raised by counter-terrorism 
policy. 
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In this paper, I have attempted to outline some of the central problems facing the field of 
terrorism studies, most importantly, its state-centricity and problem-solving orientation. I 
have argued that these inherent weaknesses are a consequence of its intellectual origins in 
security studies and counter-insurgency. More importantly, I have suggested that these 
weaknesses pose serious analytical and normative obstacles in the way of progress and 
development within the field, and are the main reason why an explicitly „critical terrorism 
studies‟ is urgently called for. I have tentatively outlined what CTS entails in terms of 
some of its core ontological, epistemological and normative commitments, its main 
subject matter and some of the central issues and questions it should be addressing. The 
purpose of this explanation was not to prescriptively establish a new orthodoxy or rigid 
set of disciplinary boundaries. Rather, its aim was to articulate the contours of a rather 
broad church in which scholars are nonetheless united by a core set of concerns and 
commitments and to stimulate further questions and debate about the current state of the 
field. Similarly, it was not meant to create division or provoke further conflict between 
orthodox and critical approaches. In fact, one of the main goals of CTS is to draw in a 
great deal of the critical, innovative and rigorous research that is produced outside of the 




On a positive note, it is important to note that in terms of a critical mass of 
scholars and an increasing set of activities and publications, the foundations for CTS are 
in fact, already well established. In the first place, there is a small but significant group of 
scholars from within the traditional terrorism studies field who have consistently 
displayed a „critical‟ approach to the dominant knowledge and practices of the terrorism 
industry, even if they would not identify themselves as „critical‟ scholars.82 Importantly, 
these respected „traditional‟ terrorism scholars have begun to stimulate debate within the 
field about some of the core problems identified in this paper. Second, there is a tradition 
of mainly left-wing, critically-oriented scholarship which has consistently spoken out 
against the embedded and politically-compromised nature of the terrorism studies field 
and which has attempted to draw attention to the problem of state terrorism and in 
particular, the record of Western support for state terror and imperialism.
83
 Third, there is 
a growing cohort of scholars and graduate students both from within international 
relations and from other disciplines who have since September 11, 2001 attempted to 
provide a critical analysis of the war on terrorism and who have adopted alternative 
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paradigms, approaches and methods to study issues related to terrorism.
84
 For the most 
part, these scholars have tended to publish their findings outside of the field‟s core 
journals and forums.  
 Apart from a significant group of scholars (and their publications) who would fall 
within the broad boundaries of a CTS even if they would not necessarily self-identify 
with it, there are a range of other developments which suggest that CTS is close to 
achieving coherence as a subfield. First, there have been a series of stand-alone 
conferences,
85
 seminars and panels within major conferences
86
 which have taken an 
explicitly „critical‟ perspective. Second, supporting the growing number of „critical‟ 
terrorism publications, there are now a number of undergraduate and postgraduate 
teaching programmes which self-consciously identify as „critical terrorism studies‟ in 
order to distinguish themselves from orthodox terrorism studies.
87
 Third, the 
establishment of the international, peer-reviewed, cross-disciplinary journal, Critical 
Studies on Terrorism, provides an important outlet for critically-oriented research and a 
focus for theoretical debate on the evolution of the field. Much of this research is 
currently being published far outside of traditional terrorism studies circles; the journal is 
one means of drawing it together in a centrally accessible form.
88
 Finally and perhaps 
most importantly, on the basis of a careful monitoring of public and academic discourse, 
private conversations with policymakers and policy intellectuals and the recent election 
results in the U.S., it can be argued that a more questioning discourse on the war on 
terrorism is slowly beginning to consolidate.
89
 The present juncture therefore, presents a 
more politically opportune moment for such a project than at any time since the start of 
the war on terror. In any case, taken together, these factors presage an exciting and much-
needed development in the area of terrorism studies. 
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